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Re: [Assurance] Information Security Guide to InCommon IAP Cross Reference


Chronological Thread 
  • From: "Cantor, Scott" <>
  • To: "" <>
  • Subject: Re: [Assurance] Information Security Guide to InCommon IAP Cross Reference
  • Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2012 20:17:05 +0000
  • Accept-language: en-US

On 7/20/12 4:11 PM, "Tom Scavo"
<>
wrote:
>
>To avoid having to modify the IAP yet again, what if we incorporated this
>directly into the boarding process for all certified IdPs? We might, for
>example, ask a to-be-certified IdP to generate a new private signing key
>and migrate the corresponding public key certificate into metadata. Does
>that seem reasonable?

It's not unreasonable on its face, but it is a giant pain. Every
non-Shibboleth/SSP SP out there is going to break, requiring a large
effort and usually a flag day. There's no rollover possible with most
commercial or one-off SPs. Many don't support multiple acceptable keys.

>We already have a policy that states IdPs "SHOULD generate a new private
>key and submit a certificate with a new public key every 3 years."
>(https://spaces.internet2.edu/x/boY0). Enforcing this policy at the time
>of certification doesn't seem too unreasonable. What do others think?

I think one of the reasons we haven't even tried to revisit that SHOULD is
that we don't know what the real need is, and it's a complete nightmare to
do it.

Sadly, "agile trust" means "don't (strongly) authenticate".

-- Scott




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