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[AD-Assurance] Do Kerberos keys use variable salt?


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  • From: "Capehart,Jeffrey D" <>
  • To: "" <>
  • Subject: [AD-Assurance] Do Kerberos keys use variable salt?
  • Date: Thu, 23 May 2013 14:55:05 +0000
  • Accept-language: en-US
  • Authentication-results: sfpop-ironport01.merit.edu; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none

I was reading a Microsoft document about MS-KILE which is the Kerberos V5 protocol extensions that Microsoft has added.  These may only apply to newer (Server 2012) versions of Kerberos, but it was interesting to note the variable salting.

 

If I read this correctly, the only way to get a variably salted hash is to use an Approved Algorithm.  I guess that doesn’t help us much.

 

Would Read-Only Domain Controllers change anything with respect to the 4.2.3.4 criteria for stored authentication secrets, in case of compromise of the KDC?

 

3.1.1.2 Cryptographic Material

Kerberos V5 establishes a secret key that is shared by a principal and the KDC and a session key that forms the basis for privacy or integrity in the communication channel between client and server. When KILE creates an AES128 key, the password MUST be converted from a Unicode (UTF16) string to a UTF8 string ([UNICODE], chapter 3.9). KILE concatenates the following information to use as the key salt for principals:

§ User accounts: < DNS of the realm, converted to upper case> | <user name>

§ Computer accounts: < DNS name of the realm, converted to upper case > | "host" | < computer name, converted to lower case with trailing "$" stripped off > | "." | < DNS name of the realm, converted to lower case >

 

The [MS-KILE] Kerberos Protocol Extensions
http://download.microsoft.com/download/a/e/6/ae6e4142-aa58-45c6-8dcf-a657e5900cd3/%5BMS-KILE%5D.pdf

 

 

5.1.1 RODC Key Version Numbers

Because read-only domain controllers (RODCs) can be deployed in less secure locations, RODCs have different key version numbers (section 3.1.5.8) to ensure they are using a different key than the domain's DCs. This protects the domain if an RODC is compromised.

 

 

Jeff

 

Jeff Capehart, CISA
IT Audit Manager
University of Florida - Office of Internal Audit
(352) 273-1882

http://oia.ufl.edu

 




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