ad-assurance - RE: [AD-Assurance] Protected Channels and the IAP
Subject: Meeting the InCommon Assurance profile criteria using Active Directory
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- From: Ron Thielen <>
- To: "" <>
- Subject: RE: [AD-Assurance] Protected Channels and the IAP
- Date: Wed, 15 May 2013 17:26:07 +0000
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Well I intend to submit an Alternative Means statement supporting the notion that an Internal Network may address the
same risks as a Protected Channel under certain circumstances.
We have a back-net between some of our IDMS components.
It is a non-routable VLAN that is not accessible from any system that is not part of the IDMS infrastructure, that is it has no inter-VLAN connectivity and no switched virtual interface defined for it.
We do not encrypt on that network, because there is no way for the traffic to be seen outside of that VLAN. I think I’ve mentioned this on some of our calls.
PCI DSS has an equivalent concept.
PCI is very stringent about encrypting cardholder data on the network; however, there is no requirement to encrypt cardholder data on Internal Networks.
Infamously, payment processors like Heartland Payment Systems don’t have to encrypt traffic in their data centers. Of course in either case, PCI or my Alternative Means, access to the network infrastructure would have to be managed
in accordance with the relevant standards.
So, the credentials used for switch maintenance would have to adhere to Silver standards. Ron From:
[mailto:] On Behalf Of Capehart,Jeffrey D Although it seems like it should be straightforward to determine whether any particular type of communications is over a network or local to a particular system,
sometimes it is not obvious just from the name, or from what IT tells you. As an example, if you have three separate domain controllers, and they communicate amongst themselves with password changes, then that is over the network.
For Active Directory, they have to be on the network to do their job and they have to be accessible. But, if there is some communications channel where passwords are synchronized and that channel isn’t a protected channel, then that could be a problem. However,
encrypting the secret would be OK, right? Well, as long as the box that the secret is decrypted on is the same one doing the synch/update, then yes it would be local (i.e. not network). Otherwise, if the process/protocol just unwraps the encryption and then
RPC’s it or Kerberizes it out to the other domain controllers, then we’re back to needing secure communication and most likely a protected channel. Does anyone see any allowance for the communications to be on the internal network being different than those outside the internal network? How about communications
behind a switch with all components physically on the same circuit that do not go outside the room/building? Both still qualify as “network” communications. Draw your own insight from NIST’s Glossary of Key Information Security Terms (NIST IR 7298 Rev 1) http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7298-rev1/nistir-7298-revision1.pdf
Jeff From:
[]
On Behalf Of David Walker Everyone, 4.2.5.3 (S) (B) SECURE COMMUNICATION (part of 4.2.5 AUTHENTICATION PROCESS)
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- [AD-Assurance] Protected Channels and the IAP, David Walker, 05/14/2013
- RE: [AD-Assurance] Protected Channels and the IAP, Capehart,Jeffrey D, 05/15/2013
- RE: [AD-Assurance] Protected Channels and the IAP, Ron Thielen, 05/15/2013
- RE: [AD-Assurance] Protected Channels and the IAP, Capehart,Jeffrey D, 05/15/2013
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